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BELTS, SUSPENDERS, AND THE
PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN
COPYRIGHTS: THE UNDRESSING OF THE
CONTEMPORARY CREDITOR
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
For over 100 years, intellectual property has served as collateral
in secured financing, enabling inventors like Thomas Edison to se-
cure loans and build companies.1 Today, intellectual property law
impacts every business and individual who offers or hopes to develop
a marketable product or service.2 While access to capital is critical to
start-up high-technology companies that have few assets other than
copyrights,3 creditors continue to have difficulty identifying and
valuing copyrighted or copyrightable material.
4
1. See Shawn K. Baldwin, Comment, "To Promote the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts": A Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Col-
lateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (1995) (citing ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON
AND THE BusINEss OF INNOVATION 43-46 (1990)). Baldwin notes that "[t]he
value of intellectual property has risen substantially in recent years, to the point
where, in many instances, a company's intellectual property is now far more
valuable than its real property. As a result, intellectual property has earned rec-
ognition as the dominant factor behind many recent commercial transactions."
Id. at 1704.
2. See William A. Dornbos, Structuring, Financing, and Preserving Security
Interests in Intellectual Property, 113 BANKING L.J. 656, 656 (1996).
3. See Aimee A. Watterberg, Comment, Perfecting a Security Interest in
Computer Software Copyrights: Getting It Right, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 855, 855 (1997) ("Making, marketing, and ownership of computer
software is the foundation of many prosperous companies. Often times equipped
with only ingenuity and bright ideas, these businesses require financial support
from commercial lenders.") (citation omitted); Dombos, supra note 2, at 657.
4. See Dornbos, supra note 2, at 657; see also Patrick R. Barry, Note, Soft-
ware Copyrights as Loan Collaterak Evaluating the Reform Proposals, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 581 (1995) (discussing how the current regime for the perfection
of security interests in copyrights impacts the software industry). Barry describes
the basic dilemma facing creditors and debtors alike as follows:
If commercial finance law imposes inordinate costs and risks upon
lenders in conjunction with the use of intellectual property as collat-
eral, then lenders will be less likely to extend credit to companies with
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Creditors with security interests in copyrights have also been
frustrated when deciding how to perfect such interests.5 Whether in-
volved in high-stakes commercial transactions or more modest ven-
tures, creditors have had to choose between the filing requirements
of the 1976 Copyright Act and those of Article 9 of the UCC.7 This
choice tends to devalue intellectual property as collateral in com-
mercial transactions since lenders, fearful of the uncertainty inherent
in such a bifurcated system, may be less likely to extend credit to
companies with a large proportion of their assets in the form of intel-
lectual property.8 Just as important, the choice between a federal and
a state system becomes essential in bankruptcy proceedings, where
the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession, acting as a hypotheti-
cal judicial lien creditor, can avoid unperfected security interests.9
a large proportion of their assets in this form. Therefore, finance laws
that are uncertain or unclear or that impose procedural burdens on
the use of intellectual property as collateral reduce the value of such
property by preventing its use to secure loans. This, in turn, reduces
market incentives for the creation of new software and hinders entre-
preneurial efforts by reducing the universe of potential collateral
available to such companies.
Id. at 583-84 (citations omitted).
5. Regarding the relevance of perfecting security interests, see infra notes
41-42 and accompanying text.
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
7. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-507 (1995).
8. See Barry, supra note 4, at 583-84.
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994), which provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the
rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect
to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a
simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or
not such a creditor exists[.j
This provision of the bankruptcy code also applies to debtors in possession.
See id. § 1107(a); National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In
re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 204-05 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing
Wind Power Sys., Inc. v. Cannon Fin. Group, Inc. (In re Wind Power Sys., Inc.),
841 F.2d 288, 293 (9th Cir. 1988)). A debtor in possession is a debtor in a bank-
ruptcy proceding who remains in control of its business or assets. See BLACK'S
LAW DICriONARY 404 (6th ed. 1990).
If creditors with a security interest in a copyright are unsure where to per-
fect their security interests, the likelihood that those creditors will actually re-
main unperfected greatly increases. Even assuming that a state filing would suf-
fice, creditors might still need to conduct searches of multiple state indexes,
instead of a single federal index, to ensure perfection; such multiple searches
would pose considerable problems in terms of expense, delay, and certainty. See
infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text; infra Part V.
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The bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession can even avoid per-
fected security interests, in some instances, as preferential transfers.0
Before 1990 discrete lenders probably opted for a belt and sus-
penders approach under which they filed at both the federal and state
levels.11 Judge Kozinski's 1990 opinion in In re Peregrine Entertain-
ment, Ltd.,2 however, reduced by half the protections available to
creditors, leaving them even more exposed under the current statu-
tory scheme to the commercial forces that determine whether an up-
start debtor company prospers or fails.1 In rebuking the lower
court's "tongue-in-cheek analogy to the use of a belt and suspenders
to hold up a pair of pants," Judge Kozinski explained why the federal
recordation system trumps state-based systems in the area of security
interests in copyrights:
There is no legitimate reason why pants should be held up
in only one particular manner: Individuals and public mod-
esty are equally served by either device, or even by a safety
pin or a piece of rope; all that really matters is that the job
gets done. Registration schemes are different in that the
way notice is given is precisely what matters. To the extent
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
11. See Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property
and Commercial Law Collide, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 1645, 1659 (1996).
No court had addressed squarely the issue of how a creditor must perfect a
security interest in a copyright until Judge Kozinski argued in favor of federal
preemption in Peregrine. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 197. While appellate courts
have since acknowledged that the Copyright Act controls the recordation of se-
curity interests in copyrights, this issue has not comprised the central holding of
any court higher than the district court level. Compare Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that "[a]ssignments of inter-
ests in royalties have no relationship to the existence, scope, duration or identifi-
cation of a copyright" and are thus not documents pertaining to a copyright), and
G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 904-06 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that protection of property interest in Supplemental Type
Certificate under California law was not preempted by federal copyright or avia-
tion statutes), with In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517,522 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997) (holding that any security interest in a "completely new and mature pro-
gram, or an accessory to an older, copyrighted or non-copyrighted program" can
only be perfected as against a bankruptcy trustee through filing with the United
States Copyright Office), and Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith
Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 42 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1991) (holding that creditor was required to comply with domestic United States
law to perfect its security interest in foreign films under Berne Convention).
12. National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Pere-
grine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990). Judge Kozinski sat by
designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(b) (1982). See id. at 197.
13. See supra note 4.
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interested parties are confused as to which system is being
employed, this increases the level of uncertainty and mul-
tiplies the risk of error, exposing creditors to the possibility
that they might get caught with their pants down. 4
Judge Kozinski's effort to focus attention on the inconsistencies
engendered by the overlapping of state and federal law underscores
the need for clearly defined rules in the area of security interests in
copyrights. His reasoning, to be sure, has not gone unheeded. 5
Much of the literature indicates, however, that such reasoning may
have precisely the opposite effect: in today's world of increasingly
complex commercial transactions, creditors may indeed find them-
selves with their pants around their knees. 6 At that point, of course,
not even a safety pin or a piece of rope would be sufficient to cure the
irreparable damage to their financial security, let alone to public
modesty.
14. Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 201. Judge Kozinski's retort reflects the logic of
Judge Cardozo's earlier warning that "[m]etaphores in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
15. At least one commentator has appreciated Judge Kozinski's analogy to
the exposed creditor. See, e.g., Nancy Bellhouse May, Belts or Suspenders? Per-
fecting a Security Interest in a Trademark or Copyright, ARK. LAW., Spring 1993,
at 8 (highlighting the current law of secured transactions as it relates to perfecting
a security interest in trademarks or copyrights).
16. See, e.g., Paul A. Baumgarten, Copyrights as Collateral: Perfection Finally
Perfected After Peregrine?, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 581, 591-92 (1994)
(noting that Peregrine failed to clarify whether registration of the copyright must
precede recordation of the security interest); Amelia H. Boss & Stephen Veltri,
Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Survey: A Plea for Cooperation,
48 Bus. LAw. 1583, 1590-91 (1993) (noting that the Peregrine decision
"jeopardized major commercial loans" and that federal filing practices, together
with their long grace periods, "diminish the value of the intellectual property
rights federal law seeks to protect"); Dornbos, supra note 2, at 669 (noting that
Peregrine's "expansive view of federal preemption creates pitfalls for a creditor
trying to take a security interest in a copyright... [and] raises even more serious
problems for those seeking to finance works that are in the process of being
completed"); Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1695 (Discussing the practical prob-
lems under Peregrine, the author notes that "[o]btaining a registration from the
[U.S.] Copyright Office ... is a matter of many months. If time is money, the ex-
pense here quite clearly exceeds that imposed by searching state files. Pere-
grine's efficiency rationale therefore proves naive on analysis, as it ignores the
facts of life in secured lending.") (citations omitted); Elise B. May, Comment,
Where Your Priorities Should Be: Analysis of the Perfection and Priority of Se-
curity Interests in Copyrights as It Affects Bankruptcy, 11 BANKR. DEVS. J. 509,
534 (1994-95) (noting that despite Peregrine, "no definitive answer exists regard-
ing whether the Copyright Act preempts the UCC with regard to perfection and
priority of security interests in copyrights").
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Scholars have dissected many, though not all, of the problems
engendered by Peregrine.17 Moreover, a recent decision issued by an
Arizona bankruptcy court threatens to further complicate matters,
especially in the areas of work-in-progress and after-acquired prop-
erty.18 It is appropriate at this time, therefore, to reexamine the proc-
ess and problems involved in perfecting security interests in copy-
rights and copyrightable material.
Accordingly, Part II of this Comment examines the federal and
state statutory provisions that bear upon the perfection of security in-
terests in copyrights. Part III then discusses the case law that has in-
terpreted this statutory web. Part IV discusses several legal ramifi-
cations of the case law relating primarily to the extent of federal
preemption of state law. This section also argues that existing law
undermines the viability of complex commercial transactions involv-
ing copyrights or copyrightable material, especially in the context of
works-in-progress or after-acquired property.
Finally, Part V analyzes potential solutions. This Comment
concludes that a federally administered system will provide the best
means for achieving both the efficiency and certainty in commercial
transactions that preoccupied Judge Kozinski,19 as well as the consti-
tutional objectives underlying federal protection of copyrights in
general. 20 A federally administered recordation system, however,
cannot depend on the current language of the Copyright Act. In-
deed, to achieve such a system, Congress must implement several
critical changes.
II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 AND ARTICLE 9 OF THE UCC
The perfection of security interests in copyrights has tradition-
ally been subject to both state and federal law.21 Even before Pere-
grine and its successors argued in favor of federal preemption, the
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 519-23.
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also Baldwin, supra note 1,
at 1732-33 (advocating the formulation of a federal approach to perfecting secu-
rity interests in copyrights based upon maximum certainty and minimal costs).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("[Congress shall have power] [t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.").
21. See, e.g., National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 197 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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wise lender probably filed at both the state and federal level.2 In-
deed, anyone who delves into the ambiguous statutory web created
by Article 9 and the Copyright Act will understand why.' A brief
overview of the applicable statutes will help illuminate this frustrat-
ing and frustrated area of the law.
A. The Copyright Act of1976
Under the Copyright Act, copyright protection extends to an
original work of authorship that is fixed in "any tangible medium of
expression."24 Copyrights therefore protect artwork, books, music,
films, software, and similar items. Furthermore, the owner of a
copyright enjoys certain exclusive rights, including, but not limited to,
the right to transfer ownership of the copyright.?
The Copyright Act defines a "'transfer of copyright ownership'
[as] an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other convey-
ance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the ex-
clusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in
time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 6
Although the terms "mortgage" and "hypothecation" are not defined
under the Copyright Act, such terms include a pledge of property as
security or collateral for a debt.27
Any transfer of copyright ownership, moreover, may be re-
corded in the United States Copyright Office provided that certain
conditions are met.? Significantly, recordation of a document in the
22. See Marci Levine Klumb, Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellec-
tual Property: Federal Statutes Preempt Article 9, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135,
136, 140-41 (1988).
23. See Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 582-86 (discussing several ambiguities
in both Article 9 and the Copyright Act).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
25. Section 201(d)(1) provides that "[tlhe ownership of a copyright may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of
law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applica-
ble laws of intestate succession." Id. § 201(d)(1).
26. Id. § 101.
27. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 669 (5th ed. 1979)).
28. Section 205 of the Copyright Act provides in part:
Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to
a copyright may be recorded the Copyright Office if the document
file[ or recordation bears the actual signature of the person who exe-
cuted it, or if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification that
it is a true copy of the original, signed document.
17 U.S.C. § 205(a).
1420
June 1998] SECURITY INTERESTS IN COPYRIGHTS
United States Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice
of the facts stated in the document if and only if: (1) the document
specifically identifies the work to which it pertains such that a rea-
sonable search under the title or registration number of the work
would reveal the work; and (2) the underlying copyrightable material
has been registered.29 Because material is copyrightable only once it
is fixed in a tangible medium of expression,' the requirement that a
transfer document specifically identify the copyright means that
creditors cannot obtain security interests in after-acquired property,
or property that is not in existence at the time the transfer document
is recorded."
Once a creditor files a security interest in a copyright, federal
law also determines the creditor's priority vis-a-vis conflicting trans-
fers.' Regarding priority, section 205 provides:
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first
prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give con-
structive notice under subsection (c), within one month after
its execution in the United States or within two months after
its execution outside the United States, or at any time be-
fore recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Oth-
erwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such
manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable considera-
tion or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties,
and without notice of the earlier transfer.33
Under this "relation-back" provision, a first transferee who records
within a month after execution of a security agreement may still have
29. See id. § 205(c). Significantly, the federal requirement that the underlying
copyrightable work be registered is not a requirement under state law. See infra
Part II.B.
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1716-18. The net effect of copyright law as
described above, see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text, means that credi-
tors have to repeatedly file appropriate recordation and registration documents
every time after-acquired property comes into existence. See infra notes 158-68
and accompanying text for a discussion of this problem. In practice, however,
creditors usually create collateral assignments requiring that after-acquired prop-
erty be conveyed to the creditor. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1716-17. Such
provisions are problematic, though, "because they rely upon the debtor to inform
the creditor of any new acquisition." Id. at 1717 (citing Raymond T. Nimmer &
Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information Property Rights, 2
HIGH TEcH. L.J. 195,224-25 (1987)).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d).
33. Id.
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priority over a second transferee, even if the second transferee re-
corded at the United States Copyright Office immediately after exe-
cution of its security agreement? 4 As a result, the federal tract prior-
ity system invariably leaves creditors with a sense of insecurity even
though they have followed every appropriate step. 5
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that a creditor
may indeed file a security interest in a copyright at the United States
Copyright Office. This, of course, is not a novel conclusion." The
harder question, and the one which seems to have evaded critical dis-
cussion, is whether the language of the Copyright Act requires the
recordation of such a security interest at the federal level. 3' Indeed,
the permissive "may" of section 205 rather than the mandatory
"shall" or "must," seems to indicate the contrary. 8
This linguistic ambiguity, however, can be accounted for by ap-
preciating the underlying context of the Copyright Act. The exclu-
sive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and
display created by section 106 of the Copyright Act do not depend on
the copyright owner's registration of the copyright with the United
States Copyright Office.39 Registration of a copyright becomes an
34. See id.
35. But see Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Legislative
Process and Commercial Law: Lessons from the Copyright Act of 1976 and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Bus. LAW. 437, 450-51 (1993) (noting that in
transaction filing systems like that embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), grace periods
are required since transaction documents cannot be simultaneously executed and
filed).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a). A security agreement pertaining to copyrightable
material is by its very nature a "document pertaining to a copyright." Id.
37. Commentators apparently do not agree, even on a semantic level, on this
basic concept. Compare Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 448-49
("[S]ection 205 [of the 1976 Copyright Act] ... provides for the permissive recor-
dation of any document 'pertaining to a copyright' ....") (emphasis added), with
Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1666 ("[The 1976 Copyright Act] also contains a
recordation scheme that requires recordation of copyright transfers . . ."
(emphasis added).
38. See supra note 28 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 205(a)).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Indeed, § 101 defines a copyright owner simply as
the owner of any of the individual rights listed in § 106; § 101 does not mention
that registration of a copyright is a prerequisite of copyright ownership. See id. §
101. Section 201 of the Copyright Act, which provides that a "[c]opyright in a
work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the
work[,]" makes this clear. Id. § 201(a). So too does that section's treatment of
involuntary transfers of copyrights, which provides that "[w]hen an individual
author's ownership of a copyright... has not previously been transferred volun-
tarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body... purport-
ing to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to
1422
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issue only when the copyright owner wishes to pursue an infringe-
ment action."
Just as copyright owners are not required to register their copy-
rights, lenders are similarly not required to record their security in-
terests for such interests to be valid.41 Indeed, recordation of security
interests in copyrights becomes a problem primarily when the debtor
files for bankruptcy. 2 Given this, it would be illogical for the lan-
guage of section 205 of the Copyright Act to require lenders to per-
fect their security interest by filing at the federal level.
Furthermore, under traditional rules of statutory interpretation,
the same word in one context can have an entirely different meaning
in another context.43 The permissive language of the Copyright Act
relating to registration of copyrights and recordation of security in-
terests in copyrights, therefore, does not necessarily allow for the
continued recordation of security interests in copyrights at the state
level. In other words, if lenders ultimately decide to file their secu-
rity interests, they can then construe the Copyright Act to require
federal filings.'
Congress, to be sure, could have eliminated this ambiguity alto-
gether by simply providing that if a creditor chooses to file a security
interest at all, then such filing must be made at the federal rather
than at the state level.45 Unfortunately, Congress was not so clear in
the copyright... shall be given effect ..... Id. § 201(e).
40. See id. § 411(a) ("[Subject to a few exceptions], no action for infringement
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright
claim has been made in accordance with this title.").
41. One author has explained the matter as follows:
Attachment or creation of a security interest simply establishes the
relationship between the secured party and the debtor and gives the
secured party a special property interest in personal property of the
debtor.- Perfection is relevant only to the secured party's position vis-
a-vis third-party claimants of the same personal property of the
debtor. Perfection has no bearing on the relationship between the
debtor and the secured party, and an unperfected secured party has
the right to enforce its security interest if the debtor defaults.
WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACT'IONS 77-
78 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 1997) (citations omitted).
42. When lenders perfect their security interests, they are in essence provid-
ing constructive notice to other potential third party claimants. See 17 U.S.C. §
205(c). The concept of constructive notice underlies, in turn, the priority be-
tween conflicting transfers. See id. § 205(d).
43. See United States v. Martinez-Cano, 6 F.3d 1400, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1993).
44. See infra Part III.
45. Congress could have resolved any ambiguity simply by using the more re-
strictive "shall" in place of the permissive "may." This was apparently the ap-
proach taken by the drafters of the Federal Aviation Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403
(1970) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (1997)). Section 1403(a) of the Fed-
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its requirements. Congress may have even intended the federal and
state systems to operate at the same time, 6 thus accounting for the
permissive language of section 205. However, the lack of clarity in
the legislative record of the Copyright Act, the complexity of inter-
action issues, and the statutory silence on the issue of preemption to-
gether render this possibility an inappropriate influence on the judi-
cial decision-making process.'
B. Article 9 of the UCC
Analysis of the Copyright Act and its legislative history, how-
ever, provides only one component of understanding the recordation
requirements for security interests in copyrights. One must also con-
sult Article 9 of the UCC.4
The UCC treats intellectual property as "general intangibles."'49
The UCC further provides that security interests in such property
must be filed under Article 9 to be perfected." Normally, this means
that security interests will be filed in the state in which the debtor's
place of business is located. In cases of conflicting security interests,
priority is generally determined by who perfected first52 and not
eral Aviation Act, which is similar in scope to § 205 of the Copyright Act, pro-
vided that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation shall establish and maintain a sys-
tem for the recording of" conveyances and the creation of liens and security in-
terests in civil aircraft. See id. § 1403(a) (emphasis added). Given Congress's
wording in the Aviation Act, the use of the word "may" in the Copyright Act is
striking.
46. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 469-70.
47. See id. at 470.
48. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 4, at 585-87; Baumgarten, supra note 16, at
585-86; Dornbos, supra note 2, at 662-66; Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1660-68;
May, supra note 15, at 10-11.
49. UCC § 9-106 defines "general intangibles" as "any personal property
(including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents,
instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of written letters of credit,
and money." U.C.C. § 9-106(1) (1995). The official commentary to § 9-106 spe-
cifically identifies "copyrights, trademarks and patents" as included in the defini-
tion of general intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt.
50. See i&L § 9-302(1) (detailing those forms of property with respect to which
a creditor need not file a security interest at the state level in order to ensure per-
fection).
51. Under UCC § 9-103, "[tlhe law ... of the jurisdiction in which the debtor
is located governs the perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of
the security interest" in general intangibles. Id. § 9-103(3)(b). Furthermore,
UCC § 9-103 also provides that "[a] debtor shall be deemed located at his place
of business ... [or] at his chief executive office if he has more than one place of
business ...." Id. § 9-103(3)(d).
52. See UCC § 9-312, which provides in part that "priority between conflict-
ing security interests in the same collateral shall be determined according to the
1424
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according to a relation-back period as under the Copyright Act. 3
Furthermore, because financing statements are indexed according to
the name of the debtor, and not by the title or registration number
of the work as under the Copyright Act,55 creditors have an easier
time verifying that their security interests are truly secure.
Unlike the Copyright Act, the UCC also provides creditors with
two additional advantages in the area of secured transactions. First,
the UCC allows a creditor to obtain and perfect a security interest in
after-acquired property, if provided for in the security agreement.56
Second, the UCC enables the creditor to obtain a "blanket lien" on a
debtor's property and to perfect that interest by filing a statement
containing a broad description of the collateral.' Together, these
provisions obviate the need for the multiple, specific filings often re-
quired under the Copyright Act. 8
Because the UCC definition of "general intangibles" includes
copyrights,5 9 copyrights and security interests therein fall within the
purview of Article 9. Sections 9-104 and 9-302 of Article 9, however,
suggest that creditors must actually file security interests in copy-
rights at the federal rather than the state level.'
Section 9-104(a) states that Article 9 does not apply to "a secu-
rity interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent
that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties af-
fected by transactions in particular types of property .... "61 The
Copyright Act is, of course, a statute of the United States and thus
satisfies at least one of the conditions of this UCC "step-back" pro-
vision. Furthermore, in any transaction involving a security interest
in a copyright, the Copyright Act necessarily governs the rights of the
following rules: (a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in
time of filing or perfection." Id. § 9-312(5); see also Weinberg & Woodward, su-
pra note 35, at 451 (Because notice filing systems speak "in terms of possible
rather than executed transactions, a single filing can give notice of multiple past
or future transactions. Grace periods are [therefore] not essential .....
53. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
54. See U.C.C. § 9-403(4).
55. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
56. See UCC § 9-204, which provides that "a security agreement may provide
that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by
after-acquired collateral." U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
57. See UCC § 9-110, which provides that "[flor the purposes of this Article
any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it
is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." Id. § 9-110.
58. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 159-69.
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. See U.C.C. §§ 9-104, 9-302.
61. Id. § 9-104(a).
1425
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1415
parties to that transaction. Finally, to the extent that transactions in-
volving security interests in copyrights impact the rights of third par-
ties, the priority scheme of section 205 of the Copyright Act deter-
mines the viability of those rights.
While section 9-104 constitutes a step-back provision relating to
security interests in general, section 9-302 contains a step-back pro-
vision that bares specifically upon the perfection of security inter-
ests.62 Section 9-302(3) provides that:
The filing of a financing statement otherwise required by
this Article is not necessary or effective to perfect a security
interest in property subject to
(a) a statute or treaty of the United States which
provides for a national or international registra-
tion or a national or international certificate of ti-
tle or which specifies a place of filing different
from that specified in this Article for filing of the
security interest .... 63
Section 9-302(4) also provides that:
Compliance with a statute or treaty described in subsection
(3) is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under
this Article, and a security interest in property subject to the
statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance
therewith except as provided in Section 9-103 on multiple
state transactions. Duration and renewal of perfection of a
security interest perfected by compliance with the statute or
treaty are governed by the provisions of the statute or
treaty; in other respects the security interest is subject to
this Articlef. 4
Because the Copyright Act is a federal statute which provides
for the filing of security interests in copyrights at the United States
Copyright Office, the Act does appear to trigger the step-back provi-
sion of section 9-302.6 Section 9-302 further states that only by filing
62. See id. § 9-302(3).
63. Id.
64. Id- § 9-302(4).
65. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1661-62. Haemmerli notes that one may
interpret the language of § 9-302 to mean that only federal statutes which provide
for a form of registered property, as opposed to a registration system for security
interests in such property, may trigger the step-back provision of § 9-302. See id.
at 1661. In support of this interpretation, Haemmerli notes that the original 1962
text of § 9-302, which referred to "'a statute ... of the United States which pro-
vides for a national registration or filing of all security interests in such prop-
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at the federal level can a creditor perfect its security interest in a
copyright.'
Sections 9-104 and 9-302, however, do contain several ambigui-
ties that cast doubt on their applicability to the recordation of secu-
rity interests in copyrights. A potential ambiguity of section 9-104,
for example, lies in its reference to affected third parties.' This am-
biguity turns essentially on whether the contemplated federal statute
must contain provisions which could conceivably affect third parties'
or whether the transaction itself must actually affect the rights of
third parties before the step-back provision is triggered.69 Indeed, if
there are no third parties challenging a transaction, then there are no
third party rights for a federal statute like the Copyright Act to gov-
ern. Since any statute triggering a state step-back provision must
govern "the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transac-
tions,"7 however, security interests in property that do not affect the
rights of third parties would not fall within the purview of this UCC
step-back provision. Perfection of such security interests would in-
stead remain subject to state recordation procedures.
Such an interpretation, however, makes little sense when one
considers that the general purpose of recordation is to provide notice
to third parties who may or may not exist and who may or may not
actually decide to enter into transactions involving another person's
property. Thus, whether a transaction involving a security interest
erty,"' was amended to its present form in 1972. Id. at 1661-62 (citing U.C.C. § 9-
302(3) (1962) (amended 1972)). Haemmerli then dismisses this interpretation as
illogical, noting the fundamental differences between the federal registration of
intellectual property and the recordation of security interests in such property.
See id. at 1662. Haemmerli also notes that the Official Comments to the 1972
text do not support such an interpretation. See id.
66. See U.C.C. § 9-302.
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. This is the reading of Judge Kozinski in Peregrine. See National Pere-
grine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertainment,
Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 202 (C.D. Cal. 1990). For a more detailed discussion of this
aspect of the Peregrine decision, see supra Part III.A.
69. While no court appears to have espoused this interpretation, the language
of § 9-104 clearly allows for such an outcome. See U.C.C. § 9-104(a). To be sure,
if a transaction involves an individual creditor and an individual debtor and there
are no third parties affected on either side, then no third party rights exist which
could be subject to the Copyright Act. Under such circumstances, the Copyright
Act would simply be inapplicable.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. This logic applies to recordation schemes for copyrights or real property.
For example, the grantor-grantee, grantee-grantor, and tract indexes for real
property used in many jurisdicitons are intended in part to alert potential buyers
of property encumbrances. Buyers who find encumbrances may either take cor-
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in a copyright actually implicates the rights of identifiable third par-
ties does not seem to bear on the issue of when federal recordation
procedures for such security interests trump state-based systems.
Another ambiguity lies in the Official Comments to sections 9-
104 and 9-302.7 The Official Comment to section 9-104 questions
whether the Copyright Act contains sufficient provisions regulating
the rights of parties and third parties in transactions involving secu-
rity interests in copyrights to exclude such transactions from the pro-
visions of Article 9.? The Official Comment to section 9-302 recog-
nizes, however, that the Copyright Act's filing requirements are
sufficient to trigger this UCC step-back provision. 4
The apparent conflict between the Official Comments and their
corresponding sections can be reconciled by considering two points.
First, the Comments refer not to the Copyright Act of 1976 but rather
rective action or simply refuse to buy the property.
72. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmnt. 1; U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 8.
73. The Official Comment to UCC § 9-104 provides in part:
Where a federal statute regulates the incidents of security inter-
ests in particular types of property, those security interests are of
course governed by the federal statute and excluded from this Article.
... The present provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. § 1403 et seq.) call for registration of title to and liens upon air-
craft with the Civil Aeronautics Administrator and such registration is
recognized as equivalent to filing under this Article (Section 9-302(3))
Although the Federal Copyright Act contains provisions per-
mitting the mortgage of a copyright and for the recording of an as-
signment of a copyrxnht (17 US.C. §§ 28, 30) such a statute would not
seem to contain sufficient provisions regulating the rights of the par-
ties and third parties to exclude security interests in copyrights from
the provisions of this Article.
Id. § 9-104 cmt. 1.
This Official Comment recognizes the Federal Aviation Act, and not the
Copyright Act, as a statute which triggers the step-back provision of § 9-104.
This may be because the language of the Federal Aviation Act compels the es-
tablishment of a system for the recording of security interests in civil aircraft,
whereas the language of the Copyright Act may create only a permissive recor-
dation scheme. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
74. The Official Comment to § 9-302 provides in part:
Subsection (3) exempts from the filing provisions of this Article
transactions as to which an adequate system of filing, state or federal,
has been set up outside this Article and subsection (4) makes clear
that when such a system exists perfection of a relevant security
interest can be had only through compliance with that system (i.e.,
filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).
Examples of the type of federal statute referred to in paragraph
(3)(a) are the provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 28, 30 (copyrights) ....
U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 8.
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to the Copyright Act of 1909.!5 Because the former contains many
provisions regulating the rights of parties and third parties in trans-
actions involving security interests in copyrights that were absent in
the latter76 the logic of the Official Comment to section 9-104 is sim-
ply inapposite to contemporary commercial transactions.7
Second, the applicability of section 9-302 has never depended,
under either version of the Copyright Act, on the extent to which
federal law regulates the rights of parties to transactions.!" On the
contrary, this section is triggered whenever federal law provides a
national place of filing security interests that differs from that estab-
lished under Article 9*79 This constitutes a more narrow window of
applicability, such that federal law could govern the filing of a secu-
rity interest in a copyright even if state law governed other aspects of
that interest.'
IIM. CONTEMPORARY CASE LAW
The statutory interplay between the Copyright Act and Article 9
of the UCC confused creditors and commentators for almost fifteen
years before the federal courts first tackled the issue of how one per-
fects a security interest in a copyright.' Judge Kozinski's decision in
1990'2 has not helped to alleviate the confusion.8 On the contrary,
this case arguably has generated several new problems where none
had previously existed.84 In fact, a recent decision by an Arizona
bankruptcy court threatens to further complicate matters, especially
in the areas of work-in-progress and after-acquired property.' A
brief overview of these two cases will clarify the obstacles now faced
by the commercial creditor.
75. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1664-65 & n.93.
76. See id at 1665-67.
77. See id at 1664-67.
78. See id at 1661-65.
79. See id. at 1665.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A-B.
82. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
83. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
85. See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
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A. In re Peregrine
National Peregrine, Inc. ("NPI") was a Chapter 11 debtor in pos-
session whose principal assets included a library of copyrights to ap-
proximately 145 films and accounts receivable generated from the li-
censing of these films to various third parties.86 In 1985 Capitol
Federal Savings and Loan Association of Denver ("Cap Fed") ex-
tended to NPI's predecessor by merger a $6 million line of creditY
This line of credit was secured by NPI's film library." Cap Fed filed a
UCC financing statement in several states, including California, but
did not record its security interest in the United States Copyright Of-
fice. 9
After NPI filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, it argued
that Cap Fed failed to perfect its security interest in the copyrights to
the films in NPI's library and in the accounts receivable generated by
their distribution based on Cap Fed's failure to record that security
interest in the United States Copyright Office.' Claiming a judicial
lien9' on all assets in the bankruptcy estate, including the copyrights
and receivables, NPI sought to recover Cap Fed's allegedly unper-
fected security interest for the benefit of the estate.9
Judge Kozinski reasoned that an agreement granting a creditor a
security interest in a copyright may in fact be recorded in the United
States Copyright Office.? He reasoned similarly that an agreement
creating a security interest in the receivables generated by a copy-
right may also be recorded in the Copyright Office, since a copyright
entitles the holder to receive income generated by the display of the
copyrighted material. 4 Judge Kozinski ultimately concluded that
Cap Fed was actually required to file its security interest in the
Copyright Office to achieve perfection.95 He reached this conclusion
by analyzing both federal and state law.9'
86. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 197.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 198.
90. See id.
91. A judicial lien is a lien "obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or
other legal or equitable process or proceeding." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 848
(6th ed. 1990). A bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession can, under certain
circumstances, avoid unperfected security interests by invoking the rights of a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
92. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 198.
93. See id. at 199.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 203. That a security interest in copyright receivables can be per-
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Judge Kozinski began his federal analysis by reasoning that even
though the language of the Copyright Act does not expressly pre-
empt state law, such a result necessarily follows from the
"comprehensive scope" of the Act's recording provisions and the
"unique federal interests they implicate."' Such interests apparently
include ensuring "'predictability and certainty of copyright owner-
ship,"' promoting "'national uniformity,"' and avoiding the
"'practical difficulties of determining and enforcing ... rights"' in
copyrights under disparate state laws.98 Another congressional policy
fected only by a filing at the United States Copyright Office has proven to be one
of the most contentious holdings of this case. Compare Weinberg & Woodward,
supra note 35, at 471-72 ("A rule giving effect to a state filing covering receiv-
ables of federal copyrights could, in effect, require lenders to search and file both
in the federal and state office to get protection for the full value of the copy-
righted collateral.... [Because] receivables are integral to the value of the un-
derlying copyrights[,] ... federal law must cover them if federal filing is to be
meaningful."), with Barry, supra note 4, at 592 ("[T]he Copyright Act does not
speak at all about receivables financing as a substantive matter .... Thus, the
court's holding stretches copyright law beyond its traditional scope-an act Pro-
fessor Jerome H. Reichman has said will lead to 'unsupportable restraints of
trade and a breakdown of the world's intellectual property system."') (quoting
STEERING COMM. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE 12).
While the issue of copyright receivables is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, it is worth noting that two recent cases have apparently qualified this
holding of Peregrine. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163, 1165-67
(9th Cir. 1997); In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 523 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997).
In Hirsch, the court held that assignments of interests in copyright royalties
were not subject to the recordation rules of the Copyright Act. See Hirsch, 104
F.3d at 1166. The assignments did not constitute a transfer of copyright owner-
ship nor did they have a "relationship to the existence, scope, duration or identi-
fication of a copyright.... [or] to 'rights under a copyright."' See id. (citing 17
U.S.C. § 106). The court, however, noted that because this case did not involve
an assignment of a security interest in a copyright, "the rationale for recordation
underlying the Peregrine case... is inapposite." Id.
In Avalon, the court held that the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement
perfected receivables created by maintenance agreements relating to computer
software license agreements. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 523. The court reasoned
that the maintenance agreements "covered a service only, and did not involve,
require, or significantly include the sale or licensing of any tangible 'intellectual
property' other than the expertise of the personnel who carried out maintenance
under such agreements." ld. (emphasis added). The court's opinion does sug-
gest, however, that the maintenance agreements may have provided for relatively
minor new releases of software. See id. To this extent, Avalon limits the reach of
Peregrine.
96. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989)).
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noted by Judge Kozinski is that copyrights be readily transferable in
commerce.
99
According to Judge Kozinski, parallel recordation schemes
would frustrate these goals for three basic reasons." First, parallel
recordation schemes would force potential creditors to undertake
numerous searches before ascertaining whether the property in
question is encumbered.' ° According to Judge Kozinski, the confu-
sion that would necessarily result is the very reason that parallel rec-
ordation schemes are "scarce as hens' teeth."' '  Second, because
copyrights are incorporeal, potential creditors could never rest as-
sured that all relevant jurisdictions had been searched.' Finally, the
expense and delay of searching numerous jurisdictions could hinder
the transfer of interests in copyrightsY4
Judge Kozinski also reasoned that, in addition to undermining
the federal objectives embodied in the Copyright Act, state filing
schemes would directly interfere with the operation of federal law.'
The conflict lies in the methods for determining priority between
conflicting transferees; unlike Article 9, under which priority is gen-
erally determined by who perfected first, the Copyright Act permits
the effect of recordation to relate back as far as two months. ' 6
In terms of his state law analysis, Judge Kozinski reasoned sim-
ply that though Article 9 establishes a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for security interests in personal property,1 it "is not all en-
compassing" given the operation of the step-back provisions embod-
ied in sections 9-104 and 9-302.1
B. In re Avalon
Avalon Software, Inc. ("Avalon") developed computer software
to assist businesses in various aspects of inventory control, from pur-
chasing through manufacturing to sales, collection, and accounting."°
99. See id. at 200.
100. See id.
101. See id
102. Id.
103. See id
104. See id.
105. See id. at 201.
106. See id. See also supra notes 33, 52 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the priority schemes of the Copyright Act and Article 9.
107. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 202.
108. See id. See also supra Part II.B for a discussion of §§ 9104 and 9302.
109. See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517,519 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
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Before filing for bankruptcy, Avalon borrowed money from Imperial
Bank ("Imperial")."0 To secure its loan, Avalon granted Imperial a
security interest in, among other things, Avalon's general intangibles
and related proceeds."' Avalon's general intangibles included copy-
righted and non-copyrighted software as well as updates and modifi-
cations thereto."' The security interest also contained an "after-
acquired" provision that extended to subsequent versions of Avalon's
software."3
Imperial filed a UCC-1 financing statement with the Arizona
Secretary of State, but it never filed any document evidencing its se-
curity interest with the United States Copyright Office. 114 A few
years before its loan from Imperial, Avalon had registered its copy-
rights on its intellectual property at the United States Copyright Of-
fice."5 Thereafter, however, Avalon did not register its copyrights on
either its newly developed products or on the updates and modifica-
tions to its previous versions."6
The court began its analysis by noting that, because a computer
program is a work of authorship subject to copyright protection,"' a
security interest in such a program must comply with federal copy-
right law."' The court stressed that the burden of perfecting a secu-
rity interest so it does not become subordinate to the rights of a
bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession rests entirely with the se-
cured creditor:
The burden to perfect properly is entirely on the secured
creditor in such an instance. It is immaterial whether the
debtor has registered its material. Perfection and construc-
tive notice to the world is accomplished by the creditor's
satisfaction of two requirements: (1) documenting the se-
curity interest with the U.S. Office of Copyright, and (2) in-
suring that a registration of the copyrighted product has also
been made at the U.S. Copyright Office."9
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 520.
113. See id. at 522.
114. See id at 519-20.
115. See id. at 520.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 520 (citing Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524
F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981)).
118. See id. at 520-21.
119. Id. at 522.
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Again, the court emphasized that the burden of registering the under-
lying copyright "is placed exclusively upon the creditor."
''
In this regard, the court rejected three arguments by Imperial.
First, the court rejected Imperial's argument that it was unable to
document its security interest until Avalon registered its product.'
Imperial asserted that a security interest not attached to a registered
copyright is equivalent to a "'wild deed,' or is a headless horse-
man.'" 2The court reasoned that the UCC allows for a creditor to file
a security interest against property that is not even in existence at the
time of filing." Thus, though Imperial's security interest contained
an after-acquired property clause, "[f]ederal copyright law does not
change that right, nor does it appear to alter those provisions of the
UCC.,,124
Second, the court rejected Imperial's argument that unregistered
copyrightable material can be construed as something other than a
copyright, such as a trade secret, so as to avoid the federal filing re-
quirements." The court reasoned that a product such as computer
software, to which a copyright attaches, "acquires its character as
'copyrightable' when the intellectual work is created."' 26 As a result,
a product which is entitled to be registered at the U.S.
Copyright Office, but is not, does not carry a different
"label" or become something different solely because it was
not registered at the U.S. Copyright Office. In other words,
120. Id
121. See id.
122. Id. Whether a security interest in a copyright could be filed before regis-
tration of the copyright was not addressed in Peregrine. See National Peregrine,
Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116
B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990). This issue was not even resolved in a subsequent case
upholding Peregrine. See Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods.,
Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991)
(holding that before a security interest in a motion picture can be perfected, the
film itself must be registered at the United States Copyright Office). In that case,
Judge Bufford acknowledged that since "[n]either party has raised the issue of
whether recordation of a copyright mortgage is valid if it is recorded before the
registration of the underlying copyright... [t]he Court does not address this is-
sue for copyrights." Id at 41 n.8.
123. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 522 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. § 47-9204 (1997);
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Flagstaff Dairy, 570 P.2d 200,205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)).
124. Id. at 522-23. This conclusion, however, appears to undermine the central
holding of Peregrine, namely that the Copyright Act preempts state law in the
area of security interests in copyrights. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying
text.
125. See i&. at 521-22.
126. Id. at 521.
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a security interest in such an item is unperfected if filed or
recorded anywhere other than at the U.S. Copyright Office.
Attempting to call such product a "trade secret" does not
change the requirement for security-interest filing at the
Copyright Office.r
Third, the court quickly disposed of Imperial's argument that the
UCC should apply to security interests in copyrightable material that
has not been registered at the United States Copyright Office."
Noting a lack of authority for this supposedly "novel proposition,, 129
the court further reasoned that such an outcome would undermine
Congress' attempt to establish central filing for security interests in
copyrights by preempting state law in this area.'m
Finally, the court held that, in general, the registration and rec-
ordation requirements remain the same in the case of derivative intel-
lectual property, or material that is in the process of development."'
The court reasoned that "[w]hether the new product is a completely
new and mature program, or an accessory to an older, copyrighted or
non-copyrighted program, any security interest therein must be filed
with the U.S. Copyright Office in order to be perfected as against a
bankruptcy trustee."'
The court suggested, however, that the after-acquired clause in
the instant case changed this general dynamic. 3 Had Imperial ini-
tially filed its security interest at the United States Copyright Office
as mandated by federal law, it would have perfected its security in-
terest in any after-acquired property,' so long as such property was
properly registered.35 The after-acquired clause, therefore, would
have at least spared Imperial from having to make repeated filings of
security agreements every time Avalon updated its software.136
127. Id. at 521-22 (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 523.
129. Id
130. See id. (citing Peregrine, 116 B.R at 200; MaIjack Prods., Inc. v. Good-
Times Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1996)).
131. See id. at 522.
132. Id.
133. See id
134. See id. at 523.
135. See id.
136. See id at 522. This aspect of Avalon undermines somewhat the pervasive
criticism that the Peregrine decision would necessitate multiple filings of security
agreements in cases involving after-acquired property or work-in-progress. See
supra note 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 158-68.
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IV. THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL AFTER
PEREGRINE AND AVALON
As mentioned above, many commentators have roundly criti-
cized Peregrine for what they view as its perversion of both state and
federal law and its myopic policy judgments." Specifically, such
criticism has focused on Judge Kozinski's treatment of copyright ac-
counts receivable,"' his failure to clearly delineate the boundaries of
federal preemption,39 and the detrimental impact that federal pre-
emption could pose to commercial transactions involving works-in-
progress and after-acquired property.'4 While Avalon dealt with all
these issues, it underscored most notably the problems associated
with the latter two."
A. Registered and Unregistered Copyrights
Indeed, by holding that perfection of security interests in both
registered and unregistered copyrights is governed by federal law,
Avalon disposed of a critical preemption issue that Peregrine
avoided.1 42 One can argue that this holding disregards the legislative
intent behind the Copyright Act, since the drafters of the Act delib-
erately excluded unregistered copyrights from its perfection provi-
sions. 43 Similarly, one can also argue that Avalon disregards the
plain language of Article 9, which is triggered only "to the extent"
that the Copyright Act governs the rights of parties to and third par-
ties affected by security interests in copyrightable material.'1 4 Under
this theory, therefore, Article 9 would simply not apply in the case of
security interests in unregistered copyrights. 45
137. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 16, 31 and accompanying text; infra notes 158-68.
141. See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 522-23 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997).
142. For a discussion of this issue, see Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1665-68.
Haemmerli argues that because "the 1976 Act deliberately excluded unregistered
copyrights from the coverage of its perfection provisions... Article 9 should not
be rendered inapplicable to them." Id. at 1668.
143. See id at 1668 (citing Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 459-60).
Weinberg and Woodward note that the drafters of the Act likely believed that"an unregistered copyright would be too il-defined for constructive notice to at-
tach to the filing of a [security agreement]." Weinberg & Woodward, supra note
35, at 460.
144. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
145. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1668.
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The above arguments, however, fail to recognize the logic be-
hind the Copyright Act's perfection provisions. The distinction be-
tween registered and unregistered copyrights was likely made not to
exclude the latter from the Act's coverage; rather, it apparently un-
derscored the drafters' desire to encourage the registration of copy-
rightable material and thereby expand the applicability of a newly re-
formulated scheme of federal copyright protection."4
In any event, regardless of whether an underlying copyright is
registered, the Copyright Act still governs the rights of parties to and
third parties affected by transactions involving copyrights. To be
sure, if secured creditors fail through inadvertence or otherwise to
register the underlying copyright, their security interests will not be
perfected.47 This, however, does not change the "extent"'8 to which
the Copyright Act governs the parties' rights. On the contrary, it
only determines the practical effect of the Act's applicability. In
other words, the Act always governs the parties' rights because it de-
termines in both cases-registered and unregistered copyrights-
whether a creditor's security interest is perfected.
The impact of Avalon, however, extends beyond its holding that
the Copyright Act governs security interests in both registered and
unregistered copyrights. Indeed, Avalon further complicated the de-
bate on federal preemption by holding that federal law governs the
perfection of security interests in any product that is copyrightable,
regardless of whether the product also qualifies for state protection
as a trade secret." Apparently, the Avalon court felt that labeling acopyrightable product as a trade secret constituted nothing more than
146. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 460 & n.148 (citing STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION;
PART 2; DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 161
(Comm. Print 1963)).
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1994).
148. U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1995).
149. See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517, 521-22 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997); supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
The court supported this proposition by citing to a case in which an appel-
late court rejected an argument because a party raised it for the first time on ap-
peal and not because of its merits. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 521-22 (citing Zenith
Prods., Ltd. v. AEG Acquisition Corp. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 161 B.R.
50,55-56 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) ("Moreover, we normally will not consider a new
issue on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances. We are especially reluctant
to consider a new issue on appeal where the issue does not involve a 'pure' ques-
tion of law.") (citations omitted)). The relevancy of this appellate rule of law is
unclear since Avalon is not an appellate case.
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an unwarranted end-run around the perfection provisions of the
Copyright Act.
Such reasoning, however, disregards the plain language of both
the Copyright Act and Article 9 of the UCC,-° as well as the logic of
Peregrine itself."' Moreover, this reasoning disregards the economic
and strategic realities that govern many commercial transactions re-
lating, for example, to security interests in computer software.52 In-
deed, owners of computer software frequently do not register the
software as a copyright but rather hold it as a trade secret."3 Even if
they do seek copyright registration, the United States Copyright
150. Trade secrets are considered general intangibles within the meaning of
Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (defining general intangibles as "any personal
property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper,
documents, instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of written let-
ters of credit, and money"); United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp.
1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966) (holding that confidential engineering concepts, ideas,
and principles are general intangibles within the meaning of the UCC); Thomas
L. Bahrick, Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 30, 32
(1987) (noting that "patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets are intan-
gible legal rights distinct from the tangible property to which they pertain");
Thomas M.S. Hemnes & Susan Barbieri Montgomery, The Bankruptcy Code,
The Copyright Act, and Transactions in Computer Software, in COMPUTER
SOFrwARE 1988 657, 700 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 255, 1988) (noting that "[b]oth copyrights
and trade secrets fall within the Article 9 definition of 'general intangibles"').
Furthermore, federal law does not normally preempt state regulation of
trade secrets and security interests therein. See U.C.C. §§ 9-104(a), 9-302(3)(a);
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding that trade secrets are not preempted by the Copyright Act);
Dombos, supra note 2, at 679 (noting that in the case of trade secrets, as opposed
to copyrights, the "simple rule" mandates appropriate state filings).
151. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990). Judge Koz-
inski predicated his endorsement of federal preemption on the fact that both the
Copyright Act and Article 9 of the UCC contain recording provisions relating to
the perfection of security interests in copyrights. See id. Specifically, Judge
Kozinski sought to avoid the confusion, expense, and delay of complying with
multiple systems and to ensure that the state priority scheme did not directly in-
terfere with the operation of federal law. See id. at 200-01; supra Part III.A. It is
therefore incongruous to hold that state protection of trade secrets and security
interests therein, which are wholly a product of state law, should be preempted
by the Copyright Act. See Mark F. Radcliffe & Nels R. Nelsen, Perfecting Secu-
rity Interests in Copyrights: The Confusion Continues, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct.
1997, at 8, 42.
152. See Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 593; Mitchell Zimmerman, Copyright
in the Digital Electronic Environment, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT
LAw 409, 451-53 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G-485, 1997).
153. See Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 593.
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Office has certain procedures in place that allow them to maintain
the trade secret status of their software. 154
The new rule set forth in Avalon, however, threatens to destroy
this balance. Now, creditors with security interests in computer soft-
ware must forgo the benefits of state trade secret protection, to which
they were once entitled, simply because the software may be capable
of copyright registration.5 The problem, of course, is not limited to
the computer industry. One only need consider an engineer who has
trade secrets in certain concepts, ideas, and principles; once those se-
crets are put into the form of blueprints and drawings, the engineer
will lose, at least under Avalon, recourse to state trade secret protec-
tion.5  The same result would occur in the case of a restaurateur who
has trade secrets in recipes and methods of preparation.'
B. After-Acquired Property and Work-in-Progress
After Peregrine, many commentators feared that creditors would
be hesitant to rely on derivative intellectual property in structuring
commercial transactions.'58 Even Judge Kozinski acknowledged the
inconvenience engendered by federal filing:
[I]t's worth noting that filing with the Copyright Office can
be much less convenient than filing under the UCC. This is
because UCC filings are indexed by owner, while registra-
tion in the Copyright Office is by title or copyright registra-
tion number. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c). This means that the
recording of a security interest in a film library such as that
owned by NPI will involve dozens, sometimes hundreds, of
154. See Zimmerman, supra note 152, at 451-53.
155. Even if the drafters of the Copyright Act sought to encourage the regis-
tration of copyrights, it is doubtful that they intended to displace state protection
of state-created intellectual property. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156. See generally Antenna Sys., 251 F. Supp. at 1016 (holding that confidential
engineering concepts, ideas, and principles are general intangibles within the
meaning of the UCC).
157. See generally Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting
claim that recipes for such well-known American dishes as BBQ chicken and
macaroni and cheese were trade secrets).
158. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1716-19; Barry, supra note 4, at 594-96;
Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 591-93; Dornbos, supra note 2, at 669-71; Wein-
berg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 475-76.
Recall that Article 9 of the UCC, unlike the Copyright Act, allows a credi-
tor to establish a blanket lien on a debtor's intellectual property and to obtain
and perfect a security interest on property which the debtor may acquire in the
future, after the security interest has been filed. See supra notes 56-57 and ac-
companying text.
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individual filings. Moreover, as the contents of the film li-
brary changes [sic], the lienholder will be required to make
a separate filing for each work added to or deleted from the
library. By contrast, a UCC-1 filing can provide a continu-
ing, floating lien on assets of a particular type owned by the
debtor, without the need for periodic updates. See UCC §
9204. 15
While Peregrine did not directly implicate after-acquired prop-
erty and work-in-progress, since the debtor's copyrights in that case
consisted of an established library of completed motion picture
films,160 commentators predicated their concern on three realities of
the Copyright Act: first, copyright protection extends to a work once
it is fixed in any tangible medium of expression;161 second, security
interests must specifically describe the copyright at issue;' and third,
the copyright itself must be registered before a security interest
therein can be perfected.63
The cumulative effect of these procedures, they felt, would bur-
den the financing process. Every line of software code, every chapter
of a novel, and every daily shooting of a film would have to be regis-
tered with the United States Copyright Office before a secured credi-
tor could perfect its interest."6 When one considers the delay accom-
panying every application for copyright registration,65 the cost of
making repeat registrations,'6 and the threat that creditors might lose
their investments should their debtors file for bankruptcy, 67 creditors'
incentives to base financing on intellectual property in its develop-
ment stage would rapidly dwindle. Furthermore, the Copyright Act's
allowance of a one to two month window after the execution of a
159. National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Pere-
grine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 202 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1990). It is also
worth noting that Judge Kozinski relegated his criticism to the middle of a long
footnote.
160. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
161. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994).
162. See id. at § 205(c).
163. See id.
164. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 475-76.
165. See Barry, supra note 4, at 597-98 (noting that the "Copyright Office has
experienced a substantial increase in the number of documents submitted for
recordation in the last few years, particularly after Peregrine was handed down,
leading to a backlog of up to nine months"). Another commentator has noted
that Peregrine led to a 50% increase in the recordation of transfer documents
with the United States Copyright Office. See Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 594.
166. See Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 593.
167. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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security agreement during which the creditor need not file at the
United States Copyright Office would only amplify the risk to credi-
tors in general."6
After Avalon, these commentators' fears appear to have mate-
rialized. By holding that the Copyright Act governs the perfection of
security interests in both registered and unregistered copyrights, the
Avalon court forced all creditors with security interests in copyrights
to confront the deficiencies of the current federal system. The court's
attempt to lessen the impact of the registration process by referring
to it as a "simple step,"'.69 however, hardly lowers the hurdles that
now face today's creditors and debtors alike, at least in the case of
work-in-progress.
Curiously, however, the court's holding in Avalon may actually
lessen the burden on creditors in terms of recording their security in-
terests in after-acquired copyrights, as opposed to registering the un-
derlying copyrights themselves. Indeed, Avalon is the first case to
hold that a creditor can record its security interest even before the
underlying copyright is registered.7 Under this rationale, creditors
need not file multiple security interests as new collateral comes into
existence and the debtor acquires rights in it.' Instead, they need
file only one security agreement containing an after-acquired provi-
sion, remembering to register new copyrights as they are created. 2
The court's holding, however, remains suspect on at least two
grounds. First, it is predicated on the UCC's provision that a security
agreement can be filed against property not even in existence at the
time the agreement is recorded.' 3 Such logic, however, misses the
central thrust of Peregrine, namely that federal law preempts state
methods of perfecting security interests in copyrights.'74 Given this, it
168. See Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1718-19; Baumgarten, supra note 16, at 593-
94.
169. In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517,523 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
170. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
171. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 522.
172. See id. at 523.
173. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
174. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199, 201-02; supra notes 97-106 and accompany-
ing text. Judge Marlar contradicts his understanding of the law when he later
states that "[flederal law is clear and well-settled that state laws, which come
within the scope of federal copyright laws, are preempted." Avalon, 209 B.R. at
523 (citing Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881,
888 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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is simply inaccurate to conclude that a UCC provision could deter-
mine how a court applies federal copyright law." ' Furthermore, the
federal requirement that a security interest specifically identify the
copyright to which it pertains17 renders the court's over-generalized
statement theoretically impossible.1"
Second, the court's holding is simply misguided from a practical
standpoint. Because copyrights must still be registered before a se-
curity interest is perfected, the court's skewing of Peregrine's logic
does not really save creditors much time or expense. The registration
requirement also means that too many early recordations could clog
the United States Copyright Office with a backlog of filings which,
without more, have no legal effect. This would only jeopardize the
system's ability to efficiently process documents that do relate to
registered copyrights. 9 In such cases, creditors hoping to finalize
commercial transactions will be forced to endure an even longer pe-
riod of uncertainty during which they may ultimately lose their in-
vestments.
V. PERFECTING THE SYSTEM: A FEDERAL SOLUTION
After Peregrine and Avalon, it appears that a federal filing is re-
quired to perfect security interests in both registered and unregis-
tered copyrightable material, even if such material could also be con-
strued as another form of intellectual property historically subject to
state regulation.'O One must remember that because Peregrine and
Avalon are lower federal court and bankruptcy court decisions, re-
spectively, they lack "binding precedential value on other courts ei-
ther in California or elsewhere."'' For this reason alone, creditors
seeking to perfect security interests in copyrights should continue to
file at both the federal and state levels.
175. See Avalon, 209 B.R. at 523; Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199, 201-02.
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(1).
177. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 451 (noting that "[m]ean-
ingful filings with respect to transactions that are merely contemplated, to prop-
erty not already in existence, or to loans that might, but will not necessarily, be
advanced are conceptually impossible") (emphasis added).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2).
179. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part III.A-B.
181. Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Intellectual Property in Commercial
Transactions, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 1992, at 5, 8 (emphasis added). Sig-
nificantly, however, no court has reversed or otherwise limited any part of Pere-
grine since that case's decision in 1990. Indeed, Avalon represents a significant
expansion of Peregrine's logic. See supra Part III.B.
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The practical necessity of multiple filings underscores the disad-
vantages that our federalist system can pose to modem commercial
transactions. '8 As intellectual property continues to grow as a domi-
nant force in commercial financing, any long-term solution must
achieve two goals to be viable: maximum certainty and minimum
cost.
183
Numerous alternatives, ranging from wholly state-based sys-
tems" to hybrid state-federal systems... to exclusively federal sys-
tems,' 86 aim to achieve these goals. While each system has advantages
and disadvantages, a reformulated federal system probably offers the
best hope of encouraging and maximizing the use of copyrights as
collateral at the local, national, and international levels. A brief dis-
cussion of each system's principal components and underlying policy
objectives should make this clear.
A. The State Approach
Under a state approach, Article 9 of the UCC would govern the
perfection of security interests in copyrights. This approach would
have two advantages. First, it would allow creditors to obtain blanket
liens on debtors' property as well as liens on debtors' after-acquired
property."' In the case of conflicting security interests, a relatively
straightforward notice scheme would determine priority." Because
there would be no requirement of copyright registration at the state
level, this approach would also encourage transactions involving
work-in-progress. Second, since practitioners are already familiar
with current state recordation provisions, they would not waste sig-
nificant energy or resources deciphering intricate and multifarious
compliance procedures.
These advantages, however, cannot overcome the realities of
current federal statutory and case law. The Copyright Act on its face
governs the perfection and priority of security interests in registered
copyrights. ' 8 Federal preemption in this area is also bolstered by the
step-back provisions of the UCC.'9 Further, current case law and,
182. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 35, at 482.
183. See id.; Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1726.
184. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 4, at 606-07.
185. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 173941.
186. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1732-37.
187. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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arguably, the language and legislative history of the Copyright Act
itself, hold that federal law governs the perfection and priority of un-
registered copyrights.19'
Any exclusively state approach, therefore, would entail signifi-
cant amendments to both federal and state law. Even if such legisla-
tive reform were feasible,ln the problem of repetitive searches in
multiple state offices would still complicate creditors' efforts to verify
the status of encumbered property and to properly perfect their in-
terests.193
B. The Hybrid State-Federal Approach
Most of the serious proposals to reform the current system in-
volve the refashioning of a hybrid state-federal approach." By advo-
cating the maintenance of two distinct systems, however, all of these
proposals invariably perpetuate an end-run around the preemptive
federal interests documented in Peregrine, thereby exposing creditors
to the pitfalls of parallel recordation schemes.'95
One commentator has suggested that federally registered copy-
rights should be subject to the Copyright Act while unregistered
copyrights would remain under the jurisdiction of the UCC."9' In ad-
dition to clearly delineating the boundaries of federal preemption,
this scheme would also reduce "perfection-induced anxiety" by
eliminating the need to register copyrights which do not really merit
registration in the first instance and by allowing blanket security
191. See supra notes 128-30, 142-48 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the interests which support the es-
tablishment of an exclusively federal system.
193. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. For example, the creditor
in Peregrine apparently deemed it prudent to file in three states. See National
Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Peregrine Entertain-
ment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 198 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
194. See S. 373, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993); Report of the
ABA Task Force on Security Interests in Intellectual Property, in Lee A. Schott &
Harry C. Sigman, Preliminary Discussion Draft of Proposed Changes to Article 9
Relating to Treatment of Security Interests in Intellectual Property, in THE
EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 417, 423 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Dec. 9, 1993), available in Westlaw, C878 ALI-ABA 415
[hereinafter Task Force Report]; PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM CODE ARTICLE 9
REPORT 50-55 (1992) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPORT]; Haemmerli, supra
note 11, at 1739-41.
195. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 199-200; supra notes 97-104 and accompanying
text.
196. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1739-41.
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interests in unregistered copyrights and security interests in after-
acquired, unregistered copyrights."
Invoking Peregrine, however, the court in Avalon flatly rejected
this scheme as a "novel proposition" lacking authority.9 " Even if the
Copyright Act supported such a proposition, it would still entail the
needless expense and delay of conducting a preliminary search at the
United States Copyright Office to determine if a copyright is regis-
tered in the first place. Such gratuitous searches only underscore the
inefficiency that a new regime should remedy.
The American Bar Association Task Force on Security Interests
in Intellectual Property ("Task Force")1 and the Article 9 Study
Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("Article 9 Committee")m each contributed more
complicated proposals in the early 1990s. Both proposals recom-
mended the adoption of a mixed approach to perfection and priority
but differed over the necessary details.2"
Under the Task Force approach, a UCC filing would perfect se-
curity interests in copyrights.' Creditors, however, would still need
to file a copy of the UCC financing statement at the United States
Copyright Office.' State filing would determine priority as against
all claimants other than purchasers for value.2 A new federal notice
filing system would determine priority as against purchasers for
value; indexed by the debtor's name, this system would replace the
existing tract system.205
Under the more convoluted Article 9 Committee approach, a
new federal notice filing system for security interests, indexed by
debtor name, would supplement the existing federal tract index.2
Creditors would perfect security interests in copyrights only by re-
cording under either Article 9 or the existing federal tract index.'
While Article 9 would determine priority as against subsequent
197. See id. at 1739-40.
198. See In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517,523 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
199. See Task Force Report, supra note 194.
200. See STuDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 194.
201. For a detailed discussion of these reform proposals, see Baldwin, supra
note 1, at 1720-26; Barry, supra note 4, at 598-602; Haemmerli, supra note 11, at
1725-29.
202. See Task Force Report, supra note 194, at 435.
203. See id. at 436.
204. See id at 435.
205. See id.
206. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 194, at 50 (Recommendation B).
207. See id. at 51 (Recommendation C).
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secured creditors, a first-to-file rule would determine priority as
against subsequent purchasers in either the federal tract or the fed-
eral notice systems.' This means that a purchaser or secured party
who records in the federal tract index would have priority over other
security interests perfected in accordance with Article 9 but not re-
corded under either federal system. This also means that the only
way to both perfect a security interest in a copyright and ensure pri-
ority over subsequent secured creditors and purchasers alike would
be to file under the existing federal tract system, the very system
which is in such dire need of reform.
At this point, it should be clear that any long-term solution
which hopes to instill consistency into the current system must also
strive for a degree of simplicity. To be sure, while the Task Force
approach clearly confines perfection to Article 9, it splits the deter-
mination of priority among the federal and state systems. Even
worse, the Article 9 Committee approach splits both perfection and
priority among a tripartite, state-federal system. Perfection and pri-
ority, however, are integral concepts, at least from the perspective of
creditors seeking a convenient and comprehensible way to secure
their investments.
Congress took the first step toward reforming the current system
with the Copyright Reform Act of 1993.2" The proposed changes in-
cluded overturning Peregrine by restricting the extent of federal pre-
emption. 1 Commentators have criticized the bill, however, for
leaving undefined the boundaries of state and federal law.212 Ulti-
mately, the bill passed the House of Representatives without the• • 211
provision overturning 2eregrne.
208. See id. (Recommendation D).
209. See id.
210. S. 373, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 897, 103d Cong. (1993). Senator DeConc-
ini (D-Ariz.) and Representative Hughes (D-N.J.) introduced the bill in the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives, respectively. See S. REP. No. 104-343, at
61 (1996); H.R. REP. No. 103-286, at I (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2954,2955.
211. Title 1 of House Bill 897 would have added the phrase "perfecting secu-
rity interests" to the language of 17 U.S.C. § 301(b), thus exempting perfection of
security interests from coverage of the Copyright Act. See H.R. 897, § 101.
212. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 4, at 603 (noting that the bill failed to elimi-
nate the "uncertainty that plagued perfection of security interests in copyrights
prior to Peregrine").
213. See H.R. 897.
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C. The Federal Approach
Rather than overturning Peregrine, as advocated by the Copy-
right Reform Act of 1993, legislators should embrace the logic of
preemption espoused by Judge Kozinski . Properly understood,
such logic has its roots in the United States Constitution, which pro-
vides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... To promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries[.] ''2 5 Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, which provides that federal laws "shall be
the supreme Law of the Land[,] '216 ensures this power.
In keeping with this constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court
has recently acknowledged that the purpose of copyright law is to en-
courage the dissemination of socially valuable works. 7 In a similar
vein, Judge Kozinski reasoned in Peregrine that federal copyright
laws secure predictability and certainty of copyright ownership,
thereby giving effect to Congress's policy that copyrights be readily
transferable in commerce."8
Still, one commentator has suggested that "'strong federal inter-
est[s]' in intellectual property financing do not satisfy the tests for
preemption articulated by the Supreme Court."219 This assertion may
be technically correct as to the characterization of the required fed-
eral interest. The suggestion that federal law should not preempt
state-based copyright financing, however, does not survive close
scrutiny.'
214. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
216. I- art. VI, § 2. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824) (holding that state laws are invalid if they "interfere with, or are contrary
to the laws of Congress").
217. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991) (noting that the "primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor
of authors, but '[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts').
218. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
219. Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1730 (citing Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1727-
28). Haemmerli concludes that these judicial tests reveal a "determination to
preempt state law that undermines the balance that Congress has established."
Id at 1675. Haemmerli, however, does not clarify the constituent elements of
this "balance."
220. Even Haemmerli reasons that where the congressional objectives under-
lying federal law are frustrated, state law cannot stand. See id.
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Indeed, copyrights today derive considerable value from their
marketability as collateral in commercial loans.21 In this regard,
Peregrine's discussion of copyright receivables proves helpful: Just as
copyright receivables are intertwined in a symbiotic relationship with
the exclusive rights of copyright ownership created in 17 U.S.C. § 106,
thereby justifying their inclusion under the Copyright Act's preemp-
tive reach,m so too does the transferability of these exclusive rights
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 201 depend on the copyright's value as collat-
eral. If a copyright's value as collateral is entrusted to a system for
the recordation of security interests that is not comprehensive, effi-
cient, and easy to use, Congress's power to encourage and support
the dissemination of copyrightable material will be compromised.m
Because the current bifurcated system does not facilitate com-
mercial transactions involving copyrights, and because the power to
regulate the perfection and priority of security interests in copyrights
should repose in a unified, federal system, Congress must undertake
serious legislative reform. To be effective, the contours of the new
federal system should incorporate elements from the existing state
and federal systems. This would require three principal changes.
First, only security interests in copyrights would be subject to federal
copyright law. Second, the new system would eliminate the current
requirement that the underlying copyright be registered. Third, a
notice filing system, indexed by debtor name, would supplement a
revised tract index. Neither index, however, would allow for grace
periods.
The proposal that federal copyright law extend only to security
interests in copyrights seeks to overturn Avalon's holding that all
copyrightable work must be federally registered in order to perfect a
security interest therein, regardless of whether such work may be
properly characterized as a trade secret." State law has historically
221. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
222. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 199 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
223. Another argument posits that a wholly federal system regulating security
interests in copyrights is impractical since many commercial transactions involve
collateral consisting of more than copyrights. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at
1730-31. This argument, however, misses the point. Just because many transac-
tions involve a variety of property does not justify the maintenance of a bifur-
cated system that controls some but not all of the property in the transaction.
Instead, by developing one system that applies uniformly to security interests in
copyrights, Congress would encourage the efficient financing of all transactions,
regardless of the amount of copyrightable material involved.
224. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
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regulated trade secrets.' Further, the language of the Copyright Act
does not extend to security interests in trade secrets.2
Segregating the treatment of trade secrets and copyrights along
state-federal lines will preserve a delicate balance in our federalist
system. It will not, however, undermine the substantive rights-associ-
ated with either form of intellectual property. Indeed, depending on
whether one characterizes a work as a trade secret or a copyright,
that work may possess different value and confer different rights
upon the creditor who takes it as collateral in a commercial loan. If a
debtor's property qualifies as both a copyright and a trade secret,
then the creditor's choice of where to file should be discretionary.
In terms of the actual mechanics of a new federal system, dis-
carding the current requirement of federal copyright registration
would prove significant. Since copyright registration currently
threatens the viability of using work-in-progress as collateral in
commercial transactions,. relinquishing this requirement will en-
courage transactions involving after-acquired property. Creditors,
therefore, could tailor their transactions as broadly or as narrowly as
necessary to satisfy their individual economic and strategic goals
without having to repeatedly register their collateral. Moreover, dis-
pensing with copyright registration will not hamper the quality of
constructive notice provided by perfection, as explained below.m
The mechanics of a new federal system would further include the
creation of a new notice filing system, indexed by debtor name. This
index would facilitate the establishment of blanket liens on and liens
on after-acquired property of the debtor. This, in turn, would reduce
the repetitive recordation of transfer documents required under the
current system. While the elimination of grace periods would neces-
sarily foster a degree of uncertainty, since creditors cannot simulta-
neously execute and file transaction documents and since any filed
document may relate to multiple past and future transactions,229
practitioners who are already adept at working with the UCC would
likely welcome this particular form of uncertainty. Indeed, the elimi-
nation of grace periods would at least assure the creditor that no
prior unrecorded transactions exist that could take priority over that
creditor's interest.
225. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.A.
227. See supra Part IV.B.
228. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1668.
229. See supra notes 35, 52 and accompanying text.
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Finally, maintaining the existing tract system-without grace
periods or the registration requirement-would benefit creditors
seeking to verify the status of known copyrights. Creditors could ac-
cess this system by either the name of the copyrighted work or by a
"tract index" file number.
Perfection and priority would depend on making an initial filing
at the United States Copyright Office indexed by the name of the
debtor in the new notice filing index and assigned a "notice index"
file number. The filing would also describe each copyright capable of
specific identification. The Copyright Office could establish proce-
dures that govern when a copyright is capable of specific identifica-
tion and the level of description required. The Copyright Office
would then assign a "tract index" file number to each copyright so
identified in the initial filing. Each tract index file number could
serve as the basis for the corresponding copyright's inclusion in the
revised tract index.
Take the example of a creditor with a security interest in a film
library consisting of fifty copyrightable films, some of which are fin-
ished products and others of which are in the process of develop-
ment, but all of which are capable of specific identification as per
Copyright Office guidelines. Assume further that the security
agreement extends to any after-acquired property in the form of
work-in-progress or copyright receivables. This creditor would sub-
mit an initial filing, destined for the notice index, accompanied by
fifty additional forms, one for each of the films, all destined for the
tract index. At this point, the creditor would have perfected its inter-
est and would have priority as against subsequent secured creditors
and purchasers alike.
If, on the other hand, the creditor's security agreement extended
to any future copyrights acquired by the debtor, such that specific
identification of copyrightable material is not possible, the creditor
would simply make the initial filing in the notice index. Again, once
the security interest attaches, the creditor would have perfected its
interest and achieved priority against any subsequent secured credi-
tors and purchasers.m
230. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1995) ("A security interest is perfected when it has
attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been
taken."). As soon as the debtor acquires rights in a copyright, the interest would
attach and perfect simultaneously. See id. § 9-203(1) (requirements of attach-
ment); see also Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 852 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1988) (bank acquired perfected security interest in debtor's future-
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This new system could still require a creditor to file periodic up-
dates describing any after-acquired property related to the copyrights
or copyrightable material referenced in the original security agree-
ment. Accordingly, creditors would file a single document under the
notice index number pertaining to the underlying transaction involv-
ing the debtor. The Copyright Office would then insert copies of the
relevant portions of this document into each of the tract files that
correspond to the copyrights referenced in the original security
agreement. If the original transaction involved only a notice filing-
because the copyright collateral did not exist at the time of filing-
and the creditor has since acquired rights in copyrights capable of
specific identification, the creditor would then submit the appropriate
forms for filing in the tract index. 3'
Failure to submit the required forms would not impact the credi-
tor's perfection or priority since the notice-index filing would have
already imparted constructive notice to the world. Instead, the
Copyright Office could assess a monetary penalty against creditors
for failing to refile. The Copyright Office could use all such penalties
to help finance the system.
This unified federal system would thus ensure the twin goals of
efficiency and certainty that are essential to perfecting security inter-
ests in copyrights. Any creditor wanting to verify the status of a
debtor's property would simply conduct a search under the debtor's
name in the notice index. If a creditor was interested in verifying the
transactional history of a given copyright, it could also search the
tract index, provided it knew the title of the copyright or the copy-
right's tract file number. Either way, creditors would have construc-
tive notice of any actual or potential encumbrances on the lender's
property. If a creditor found any encumbrances, it would then be
sure to obtain sufficient warranties of title from its debtor. Finally, as
technology develops and resources allow, this unified system could be
incorporated into an even more efficient and accessible electronic da-
tabase. 2
acquired inventory, accounts, and proceeds at time transfer of the assets took ef-
fect because financing statement covering a security interest in such collateral
was already on file).
231. In a sense, this reoriented tract index would serve as an informal registra-
tion system. Once a creditor obtains a security interest in a specifically identifi-
able copyright and records that interest, the Copyright Office would then cata-
logue the encumbered copyright in the tract index under its name and assigned a
fie number. The creditor would eventually make appropriate filings for any up-
dates or modifications to the copyright.
232. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 1, at 1736 n.162 ("If documents filed with
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VI. CONCLUSION
Copyrights already play a vital role in the financing of commer-
cial transactions. As the information age continues its progression
into an increasingly complex and global economy, the collateralizing
of copyrights will only intensify. Despite such seeming progress,
however, the bifurcated state and federal statutory scheme for per-
fecting security interests in copyrights remains mired in inconsistency
and inefficiency. While Peregrine and Avalon have elucidated the ex-
tent to which federal law preempts state law in this area, these cases
have simultaneously exposed the problems created when federal pre-
emption extends both too far and not far enough. There is no reason
why copyright law should preempt state regulation of security inter-
ests in trade secrets simply because trade secrets may happen to be
copyrightable themselves. On the other hand, uniform application of
existing federal law is burdensome and archaic when considered in
light of modem UCC financing principles.
A new system is needed to govern the perfection and priority of
security interests in copyrights. While state-based systems ignore the
federal interests involved, hybrid state-federal systems perpetuate
confusion and inefficiency. A unified federal system thus presents
the best long-term solution. Properly designed, such a system would
not only encourage and facilitate commercial transactions involving
security interests in copyrights, it would also give effect to the pre-
emptive federal interest in this area.23' Concerted congressional re-
form is the first step toward realizing these twin goals of efficiency
and certainty.
Peter L. Choate*
the federal offices were stored in a medium such as CD-ROM, searches could be
performed on any field, rather than by the traditional index approach. Thus, a
search by debtor name or by specific piece of property could be accomplished
through a single system."); Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1748 & n.467, 1749
("[A]ny hope of replicating the efficiency of the UCC filing system depends on
being able to approach the time frames achieved by state UCC filing offices.
Unless this is accomplished, no reform proposal will materially improve the level
of certainty enjoyed by secured creditors.").
233. See supra notes 97-106, 215-18 and accompanying text.
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